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I. INTRODUCTION
ETAL tissue transplantation (the injection of fetal tissue into per-
sons suffering from certain diseases or disorders) is a relatively new
technology.' It holds as much controversy as it does promise for
curing many diseases. Recent studies have shown that fetal tissue trans-
plants have the potential to restore functioning in persons suffering from
severe chronic diseases like Parkinson's disease and juvenile diabetes,
and many nervous-system disorders.2 Scientists and doctors promote and
justify experimental research using fetal tissue because it has the poten-
tial to cure or greatly improve the quality of life for thousands and possi-
bly millions of suffering patients.3
Despite the praises of scientists and doctors, the issue of fetal tissue
transplantation research has become a source of heated legal and ethical
debate over the past two decades. Although fetal tissue research has
been conducted in the United States for over half a century (and played a
part in the development of the polio and rubella vaccines),4 it did not
1. Experiments have been performed on fetuses for many years in this country, but
research involving the use of fetal tissue to cure post-birth illnesses has generally only been
attempted since the early 1970s. BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH 172 (1992).
2. See Lee M. Sanders et al., Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 159 W.J. MED.
400 (1993).
3. See STEINBOCK, supra note 1, at 171.
4. Rachel B. Gold & Dorothy Lehrman, Fetal Research Under Fire: The Influence of
Abortion Politics, FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Jan-Feb. 1989, at 6-7. The polio vaccine was devel-
oped with cultures of human fetal kidney cells and fetal tissue was used by the developers




capture public attention until the legalization of abortion in 1973. 5 A
politically-based debate has since raged over the legality and morality of
fetal tissue transplantation research. 6 Many believe fetal tissue transplan-
tation research is morally acceptable because fetuses are not yet human.
Many others believe fetuses are human beings and, therefore, experi-
menting on them is unethical.
Congress attempted to solve the legal and moral problems involved
with fetal tissue transplantation research by passing the NIH Revitaliza-
tion Act of 1993 ("the Act"). 7 This law effectively separates the decision
to abort from the decision to donate fetal remains.8 Additionally, the Act
makes it a criminal offense to purchase or to sell any fetal tissue. 9 The
specific designation of a person to receive fetal tissue or a promise of such
a designation is also made a criminal offense. 10 Although Congress
meant for the Act to resolve the existing problems surrounding this issue,
it seems that the law may have opened up a new legal can of worms over
fetal tissue transplantation research.
The Act on its face is extremely vague. It provides that fetal tissue
transplantation research may only be conducted for "therapeutic pur-
poses" but neglects to define that term.'1 Moreover, the Act criminalizes
the sale and purchase of fetal tissue for an amount above reasonable
processing fees but does not specifically reveal what reasonable process-
ing fees might be.' 2 The Act also appears to infringe upon a woman's
fundamental right to have an abortion by making it illegal for the mother
to designate the recipient of the fetal tissue. 13
5. See Gregory Gelfand & Toby R. Levin, Fetal Tissue Research: Legal Regulation of
Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 647, 665-68 (1993).
6. For a discussion on the ethical debate over fetal tissue transplantation research,
see infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
7. The pertinent part of this Act has been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 289g-1 & g-2 (Supp.
V 1993).
8. See S. REP. No. 2, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
196. This was accomplished through prohibitions against the designation of a recipient by
the donor (42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993)) and a series of consent requirements
(42 U.S.C. § 289g-l(b),(c) (Supp. V. 1993)).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(a) (Supp. V 1993).
10. Id. § 289g-2(b) (Supp. V 1993).
11. See id. § 289g-l(a) (Supp. V 1993).
12. The Act states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive,
or otherwise transfer any human fetal tissue for valuable consideration if the transfer af-
fects interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(a). "Valuable consideration" is defined in
section 289g-2(d)(3) as "not includ[ing] reasonable payments associated with the transpor-
tation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, or storage of human fetal
tissue." 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(d)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
13. Id. § 289g-2(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or knowingly acquire, receive, or
accept a donation of human fetal tissue for the purpose of transplantation of
such tissue into another person if the donation affects interstate commerce,
the tissue will be or is obtained pursuant to an induced abortion, and -
(1) the donation will be or is made pursuant to a promise to the donating
individual that the donated tissue will be transplanted into a recipient speci-




This Comment discusses these problems. Part II provides a brief de-
scription of fetal tissue transplantation research. Part III contains a dis-
cussion of the benefits of this type of research. Part IV presents a
historical sketch of fetal tissue research in the United States. Part V ex-
poses some aspects of the ethical debate over this research. Part VI
reveals the state of current federal law on the topic. With the framework
explained in Parts II-VI, Part VII then discusses various problems that
remain after the adoption of the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993. Lastly,
Part VIII suggests some of the changes that Congress should implement
to remedy these problems.
II. DESCRIPTION OF FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION
RESEARCH
Fetal tissue transplantation is a delicate procedure in which cells taken
from the brain, pancreas, or other parts of an aborted fetus are processed
and injected directly into the faulty organs of persons suffering from par-
ticular diseases. 14 As of 1993, experimentation had been performed on
"patients with Parkinson's disease, insulin-dependent diabetes, the DiGe-
orge syndrome, severe combined immunodeficiency, aplastic anemia,
acute myelogenous leukemia, thalassemia, Fabry's disease, Hurler's syn-
drome, and Gaucher's disease."'1 5 Some researchers and physicians con-
tend that fetal tissue could possibly be used to treat Alzheimer's disease,
congenital heart, liver, and kidney failure, and other blood and endocrine
problems in humans.16 Thus far, physicians have met with limited success
in treating Parkinson's disease, the DiGeorge syndrome, juvenile (insu-
lin-dependent) diabetes, and certain nerve injuries.17
A. PARKINSON'S DISEASE
Parkinson's disease is caused by the degeneration of brain cells located
in the substantia nigra.' 8 The death of these cells results in a decrease in
the brain's production of dopamine, a neurochemical necessary for
(3) the person who solicits or knowingly acquires, receives, or accepts the
donation has provided valuable consideration for the costs associated with
such abortion.
14. Kathleen McAuliffe, Cures from Aborted Fetal Tissue: A Startling Fount of Heal-
ing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 3, 1986, at 68. Since these diseases are thought to
result from a deficiency in certain cell products, many physicians and scientists believe that
the injection of healthy cells into afflicted patients will relieve symptoms of the disease.
John A. Robertson, Abortion to Obtain Fetal Tissue for Transplant (Oct. 11, 1993) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Suffolk University Law Review).
15. Sanders, supra note 2, at 400.
16. Id.
17. See id.; see also Joe Levine, Help from the Unborn: Fetal-Cell Surgery Raises Hopes
-and Issues, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987, at 62.
18. Leon Jaroff, Steps Toward a Brave New World, TIME, July 13, 1987, at 56. The
substantia nigra is located "bilaterally throughout the entire length of the mesencephalon."




proper motor coordination. 19 The result of this lack of dopamine is vio-
lent trembling and muscular rigidity.2 0
Since 1987, researchers have transplanted dopamine-producing fetal
cells into the brains of patients with Parkinson's disease.21 Results have
varied,22 but the research consistently shows that transplantation im-
proves "self-assessed quality of life; it decreases the frequency and inten-
sity of 'freezing spells'-a characteristically disabling feature of the
disease-and decreases the required dosage of levodopa. ''23 These re-
sults indicate that fetal tissue transplantation may be the source of a cure
for Parkinson's disease. There are, however, at least three alternate ex-
planations for these benefits.
First, poking around in the brain during surgery may stimulate dis-
eased cells to start production of repair chemicals, including growth
factors that could trigger dopamine release. Second, perhaps the de-
veloping fetal cells themselves make the growth factors but not
dopamine. Or third, the success stories may have nothing at all to do
with the transplants but are just part of the mysterious remission-
and-relapse cycle characteristic of Parkinson's. 24
In any case, the National Institutes of Health recently awarded a $4.5
million grant to test the benefits of dopamine-producing fetal tissue trans-
plants in the brains of Parkinson's patients.25 Dr. Curt Freed of the Uni-
versity of Colorado received the grant and will use the money to
experiment on forty patients suffering from the disease.26 The patients
will have small holes drilled into their skulls through which injections can
be made directly into their brains.27 Half of the patients will have fetal
cells injected into these holes and the other half will act as a control
group and will be injected with only a saline solution. 28 This study should
19. McAuliffe, supra note 14, at 69.
20. See id.; see also Jaroff, supra note 18, at 56. Another aspect of the disease is that
even though Parkinson's patients eventually lose the ability to talk, walk, and move, their
mental facilities remain untouched. Traci Watson, A Tissue of Promises, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 8, 1994, at 50.
21. Sanders, supra note 2, at 401.
22. See Curt R. Freed et al., Survival of Implanted Fetal Dopamine Cells and Neurolog-
ical Improvement 12 to 46 Months After Transplantation for Parkinson's Disease, 327 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1549 (1992); I. Madrazo et al., Transplantation of Fetal Substantia Nigra and
Adrenal Medulla to the Caudate Nucleus in Two Patients with Parkinson's Disease, 318 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 51 (1988); Dennis D. Spencer et al., Unilateral Transplantation of Human
Fetal Mesencephalic Tissue into the Caudate Nucleus of Patients with Parkinson's Disease,
327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1541 (1992).
23. Sanders, supra note 2, at 401. Levodopa, or L-dopa, is a drug that has been given
to Parkinson's patients since the 1960s to boost the amount of dopamine in their brains to a
normal level. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMON DISEASES 1063 (Charles Gerras et al. eds.,
1976); see Jeff Goldberg, Fetal Attraction: Fetal Tissue Transplant Treatment for Parkinson's
Disease, DISCOVER, July 1995, at 86.
24. Dick Thompson, When Abortions Save Lives, TIME, Apr. 6, 1992, at 53.
25. Ronald Kotulak, Scientists Find Chemicals that Fix the Brain: Discoveries Show
Circuits Get Rewired, New Parts Grow, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1994, at 1.
26. Id.
27. See Thomas H. Maugh II, Fetal Cell Grafts for Parkinson's Win Converts, L.A.




provide definitive results as to the efficacy of fetal tissue transplants for
Parkinson's patients.
B. DIGEORGE SYNDROME
The DiGeorge syndrome is "an inmunodeficiency resulting from the
absence of thymus and parathyroid tissue at birth."'29 It is extremely rare
but very deadly. 30 Among the symptoms of the disease are heart defects,
mental retardation, and severe immune system deficiencies. 31 For over
twenty-five years patients with the DiGeorge syndrome have responded
well to transplants of fetal thymus cells.32 Fetal thymus transplantation
remains the only treatment option for this disease if a tissue-compatible
sibling is not available. 33
C. JUVENILE DIABETES
Juvenile (insulin-dependent) diabetes occurs when the pancreatic cells
that produce insulin gradually die.34 The lack of insulin allows blood-
sugar levels to rise dangerously and can cause the rupture of eye capilla-
ries (resulting in blindness) and heart and kidney failure.35 Daily injec-
tions of insulin are necessary to slow the effects of the disease, but they
cannot prevent the disease from progressing. 36
By implanting specially cultured insulin-producing fetal tissue, some re-
searchers have been successful in treating insulin-dependent diabetes.
37
Of thirty-nine diabetics treated with fetal tissue transplants at Shanghai
People's Hospital since 1982, three were no longer insulin dependent and
the others reduced their insulin requirements from thirty percent to al-
most one hundred percent.38 Results in the United States have not been
as impressive. 39
29. Sanders, supra note 2, at 401.
30. Thompson, supra note 24, at 53. If the absence of the thymus gland is not cor-
rected, the child is apt to die of infection within the first year of its life. Kenneth J. Ryan,
Tissue Transplantation from Aborted Fetuses, Organ Transplantation from Anencephalic In-
fants and Keeping Brain-Dead Pregnant Women Alive Until Fetal Viability, 65 S. CAL. L.
REv. 683, 684 (1991). The absence of the thymus results in the person falling victim to
many viral and fungal infections that the person is unable to fight off due to weak produc-
tion of lymphocytes. Rebecca H. Buckley, Immunodeficiency Diseases, 268 JAMA 2797,
2800-01 (1992).
31. Jim Detjen, Philadelphia Hospital Chosen for US. Genetic Project, PHIL. IN-
QUIRER, May 7, 1991, at Al.
32. See C.S. August et al., Implantation of a Foetal Thymus Restoring Immunological
Competence in a Patient with Thymic Aplasia (DiGeorge Syndrome), 2 LANCET 1210
(1968). By 1991, 27 transplantations had occurred with 9 infants surviving. Ryan, supra
note 30, at 684.
33. Ryan, supra note 30, at 685.
34. McAuliffe, supra note 14, at 68.
35. Id.
36. See Levine, supra note 17, at 62; McAuliffe, supra note 14, at 68.
37. Levine, supra note 17, at 62.
38. Id.
39. Id. The reduction in insulin requirements for diabetics after transplantation in the
United States appears to be transient. Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation,




Injuries that cause damage to the spinal cord are currently incurable
because the damaged nerve cells cannot repair themselves. 40 Doctors,
however, have attempted fetal nerve cell transplantations on cats with
some success.41 In one experiment, partially paralyzed cats were injected
with fetal nerve cells and some began to walk again-one cat could even
climb stairs.42 The researchers believe the growing fetal cells branched
out and connected with the cats' undamaged nerve tissue, raising hopes
that the same potential exists for humans.43
E. THE NECESSITY FOR ELECTIVELY ABORTED TISSUE
Most researchers contend that the success of fetal tissue transplanta-
tion depends on tissue obtained through elective abortions."4 Fetuses ob-
tained from spontaneous abortions and ectopic pregnancies often contain
genetic abnormalities that make the tissue unusable in transplantation re-
search.4 5 Thus, it seems essential that research be conducted with elec-
tively-aborted tissue to lessen the risk of infecting a recipient with
genetically-defective tissue and to increase the likelihood of the trans-
plantation's success. 46
III. BENEFITS OF FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION
Fetal tissue holds great promise for helping to cure many diseases be-
cause it has several unique properties that make the transplantations ef-
fective. Unlike transplants involving adult human tissue, fetal tissue
transplants are generally not rejected by the recipient's body.47 This is
because fetal tissue has a greater growth ability, special immune proper-
ties, and is more adaptable than adult tissue.4 8
however, many times it is closer to 0%. See Levine, supra note 17, at 62; McAuliffe, supra
note 14, at 69; Thompson, supra note 24, at 53.




44. See Jaroff, supra note 18, at 57; Levine, supra note 17, at 62; Sanders, supra note 2,
at 404; Thompson, supra note 24, at 53.
45. Jaroff, supra note 18, at 57. It has been contended that only 3.8% of spontaneous
abortions will provide tissue eligible for transplantation, but this figure includes fetuses
which died much earlier in pregnancies and, thus, were not developed enough for trans-
plantation. Sanders, supra note 2, at 404. Of ectopic pregnancies, only 1% are unassociated
with tubal hemorrhage that causes early organ death in fetuses. Daniel J. Garry et al., Are
There Really Alternatives to the Use of Fetal Tissue from Elective Abortions in Transplanta-
tion Research? 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1592, 1595 (1992).
46. See S. REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 21.
47. Ryan, supra note 30, at 684.




One of the greatest advantages of fetal tissue is that it has a greater
ability to divide and grow than adult tissue.49 Cell division occurs very
rapidly in a fetus and then slows with age.50 "Similarly, the percentage of
cells capable of division decreases with age."''s Fetal tissue thus has a
greater potential to grow inside a transplant recipient and to possibly re-
pair damaged cells than does adult tissue.
B. SPECIAL IMMUNE PROPERTIES
Another advantage of fetal tissue is that these cells have special im-
mune properties.5 2 Fetal cells have not yet developed all the antigens
that cause the recipient's immune system to locate and subsequently re-
ject them.53 Moreover, the cells can be purified to reduce the possibility
of rejection. 54 Thus, there is little need for tissue matching or immu-
nosuppression treatment with fetal tissue transplants. 55
C. ADAPTABILITY
Another unique advantage of fetal tissue is its adaptability or "plastic-
ity."'5 6 Fetal cells have the ability to functionally adapt to their environ-
ment.5 7 They "change shape, migrate, and become functionally
integrated into their surroundings better than cells from an older organ-
ism."' 58 This means that fetal tissue has the potential to replace, if not
entirely repair, damaged cells in a patient.
D. ABILITY TO BE FROZEN
Another characteristic that makes fetal tissue more attractive to re-
searchers than other tissue is, as some researchers contend, its ability to
be frozen and still remain viable.59 It is not yet known with certainty,
however, if frozen fetal tissue can be used for all purposes because fetal
tissue transplantation research is still in its infancy stage.60 Fetal tissue
appeals to many researchers because, unlike many other types of tissue, it
appears to have this potential characteristic. 61
49. Ryan, supra note 30, at 684.
50. Gold & Lehrman, supra note 4, at 7.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Levine, supra note 17, at 62.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id.; Ryan, supra note 30, at 684.
57. Gold & Lehrman, supra note 4, at 7.
58. Ryan, supra note 30, at 684.
59. See Mark W. Danis, Note, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designa-
tion, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1079, 1084 (1988).
60. Gelfand & Levin, supra note 5, at 656 n.53.





A particularly important advantage of fetal tissue is its availability. As
of 1990 there were approximately 1.5 million abortions performed annu-
ally in the United States.62 The transplantable fetal tissue that could be
removed from these aborted fetuses would more than adequately provide
for the needs of researchers and patients. 63
IV. HISTORY OF FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH IN THE
UNITED STATES
Fetal tissue transplantation research has been conducted in the United
States since the 1930s but was relatively unheard of until 1973.64 That
was a monumental year in this field of research; not only was it the year
that Roe v. Wade was decided, it was also the year that scientists decapi-
tated a dozen live fetuses and kept the fetal heads alive through artificial
means. 6 5 Around the same time, other researchers used saline solutions
to keep aborted fetuses alive to determine if they could absorb oxygen.66
Because of public outcry over these experiments, the NIH halted all fed-
erally funded research unless it directly benefited the fetus.67
All remained quiet on the fetal tissue front until 1988 when a group of
NIH scientists requested approval from the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to use fetal brain tissue in a research protocol
already sanctioned by the NIH's review board.68 In response to this re-
quest, Robert Windom, the HHS Assistant Secretary, imposed a tempo-
rary moratorium on fetal tissue research for transplantation purposes.69
This moratorium was intended to last until a twenty-one-member NIH
panel70 studied and reported on the ethical, legal, and scientific issues
62. Arthur R. Bauer, Fetal Tissue Transplantation, TRIAL, July 1990, at 22.
63. See id.
64. Sanders, supra note 2, at 405.
65. Kenneth L. Woodward et al., A Search for Limits, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1993, at 52.
This experiment was partially funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and was
designed to measure fetal metabolism. Id.
66. Id One fetus survived for nearly 24 hours. Id.
67. Id.
68. Gold & Lehrman, supra note 4, at 9.
69. Sanders, supra note 2, at 405.
70. The members of the panel were: the Honorable Arlin M. Adams, U.S. Court of
Appeals (Ret.); Kenneth J. Ryan, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston; LeRoy Wal-
ters. Georgetown University, Kennedy Institute of Ethics; Rabbi J. David Bleich, Cardozo
Law School; James Bopp, Jr., Esq.; James T. Burtchaell, University of Notre Dame; Robert
C. Cefalo, University of North Carolina School of Medicine, Chapel Hill; James F. Chil-
dress, University of Virginia, Charlottesville; K. Danner Clauser, Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, Hershey; Dale Cowan, Marymount Hospital, Ohio; Jane Delgado, National
Coalition of Hispanic and Human Services Organizations; Bernadine Healy, Cleveland
Clinic Foundation; Dorothy I. Height, National Council of Negro Women; Barry J. Hoffer,
University of Colorado, Denver; Patricia A. King, Georgetown University Law Center;
Paul Lacy, Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis; Joseph B. Martin, Massa-
chusetts General Hospital, Boston; Aaron Moscona, University of Chicago; John Robert-
son, University of Texas School of Law; Daniel Robinson, Georgetown University; and
Charles Swezey, Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Va. Gold & Lehrman, supra
note 4, at 10.
19961
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associated with this type of research. 71 Despite the panel's conclusion
that the use of human fetal tissue for transplantation research was accept-
able public policy, 72 HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan extended the morato-
rium indefinitely on the grounds that this type of research would increase
the incidence of induced abortions.73 This administrative declaration also
ignored the panel's additional recommendations that effective safeguards
could be erected to ensure that abortions solely for research purposes
would not occur.74 Thus, even though the human fetal tissue transplanta-
tion research panel represented a broad cross-section of American
academia and medical professionals, its recommendations fell on deaf
ears.
Legislative attempts to overturn the moratorium passed in the House
of Representatives in 1991 and in the Senate in 1992.75 But Congress
failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds vote to overcome President
George Bush's veto.76 Soon after taking office in 1993, President William
Clinton sent a memorandum to the Secretary of HHS ordering the end of
the moratorium on fetal tissue transplantation research. 77  Subsequent
to this directive, the Secretary of HHS rescinded the prohibitory ban on
federal funding of this research on February 5, 1993.78 Within days, a bill
was presented in the Senate, amended by the House of Representatives,
and rapidly passed by both houses of Congress on May 28, 1993.7 9 On
June 10, 1993, President Clinton signed Public Law 103-43 into effect as
the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993.80
V. ASPECTS OF THE ETHICAL DEBATE OVER FETAL
TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH
A. OPPONENTS TO FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH
The most well known opponent to the use of fetal tissue in transplanta-
tion research is James T. Burtchaell. 81 Burtchaell contends that fetal tis-
sue transplantation research is improper under any circumstance. 8 2 He
71. See id. at 9, 10.
72. NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTA-
TION PANEL (Wash., D.C. 1988), summarized in Report of NIH Human Fetal Tissue Trans-
plantation Research Panel, 2 BIoLAW U:1299 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE HUMAN
FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION PANEL].
73. See Sanders, supra note 2, at 405.
74. See REPORT OF THE HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION PANEL, supra note
72, at U:1299.
75. Sanders, supra note 2, at 405.
76. President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval
the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Amendments of 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1132 (June 23, 1992).
77. 58 Fed. Reg. 7457 (1993).
78. 58 Fed. Reg. 7468 (1993).
79. S. REP. No. 2, supra note 8.
80. This Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 289g-1 & g-2 (Supp. V 1993).
81. Burtchaell, a theologian at the University of Notre Dame, was a member of the
human fetal tissue transplantation research panel. Gold & Lehrman, supra note 4, at 10.
82. See James T. Burtchaell, Case Study: University Policy on Experimental Use of
Aborted Fetal Tissue, IRB, July-Aug. 1988, at 7.
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believes that "one must decide at the outset not to exploit any human
individuals to obtain prospective benefits for others," which is the exact
effect of fetal tissue transplantation research. 83 Burtchaell argues that
there are at least three strong objections to fetal tissue transplantation
research on electively aborted fetuses: 1) once a woman has an abortion,
she has abandoned her parental capacity to authorize research on the
fetus; 2) any researcher acts with moral complicity in the destruction of
the fetus after the fact if he or she participates in research on the tissue;
and 3) there are other sources of fetal materials available for use in re-
search (such as spontaneous abortions and ectopic pregnancies).8 4 For
these reasons, Burtchaell adamantly opposes any federal legislation that
favors fetal tissue transplantation research.
Kathleen Nolan also contends that fetuses from elective abortions
should not be eligible as sources of transplantable tissue. 85 She states
that any woman who acts as the "agency of death" of a relative should
not be able to act also as a decision-making proxy for that relative's organ
donation. 86 The fetus, in her eyes, is a murder victim and since murderers
cannot consent to the donation of their victim's organs, aborting mothers
should not be allowed to consent to the donation of the aborted tissue.
She concludes that only tissue from spontaneous abortions and ectopic
pregnancies should be used in fetal tissue transplantation. 87
The dissents found in the human fetal tissue transplantation research
panel's report also raised some interesting issues in opposition to this
type of research. In his dissent, J. David Bleich argued against allowing
fetal tissue transplantation research in this country. He stated that
although the potential this research holds appears promising, it is dimin-
ished by two elements: 1) the therapeutic efficacy of the procedure is yet
unknown, and 2) the benefits will only accrue to future patients.8 8 For
Rabbi Bleich, a moral harm which outweighed the prospective benefits of
fetal tissue transplantation research was certain to result if the panel's
recommendations were implemented. 89
Burtchaell authored a joint dissent with James Bopp in which they con-
tended that fetal tissue transplantation research is ethically compromised
by at least three factors: 1) the lack of authentic consent; 2) the complicity
with the abortions; and 3) the incentives it will offer for more abortions.90
Due to these factors, Burtchaell and Bopp refused to conclude, as did all
others on the panel except Rabbi Bleich, that fetal tissue transplantation
research is morally appropriate.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id at 8-10.
85. Kathleen Nolan, Genug ist Genug: A Fetus Is Not a Kidney, HASTINGS CENTER.
REP., Dec. 1988, at 13.
86. Id. at 14.
87. Id






B. PROPONENTS OF FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH
The number of authors who favor fetal tissue transplantation research
far outweigh the number of opponents. Most proponents believe that as
long as ethical guidelines separate the decision to abort from the decision
to donate fetal tissue, salvaging tissue from an aborted fetus is consistent
with organ donation from any human cadaver and, therefore, is ethically
appropriate. 91 For them, the use of an electively aborted fetus in trans-
plantation is more ethically correct than the alternative dispositions as
organic trash which had been the prevailing method of aborted fetal tis-
sue disposition prior to the enactment of the NIH Revitalization Act of
1993.92
John Robertson has concluded that we have an ethical duty to cure
diseases and alleviate suffering wherever possible. Since fetal tissue
transplantation research accomplishes this task, as long as it is well-regu-
lated, it is ethically correct. 93 Professor Robertson believes that this type
of research is not only morally appropriate, it is necessary. The necessity
of fetal tissue transplantation research exists because it has the potential
to cure many persons, and tissues available from spontaneous abortions
will not be able to fulfill all the research needs involved. 94 For him, and
many others, the end justifies the means.95
VI. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING FETAL TISSUE
TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH
Although the primary law concerning fetal tissue transplantation re-
search is currently located in the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 (the
relevant part of the Act is codified at, and hereinafter referred to as, 42
U.S.C. §§ 289g-1 & g-2), there are several other federal laws that have a
91. See Gelfand & Levin, supra note 5, at 694. In fact, this was the conclusion reached
by a majority of the human fetal tissue transplantation research panel in 1988. See REPORT
OF THE FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION RESEARCH PANEL, supra note 72, at U:1299.
92. Benjamin Freedman, The Ethics of Using Human Fetal Tissue, IRB, Nov.-Dec.
1988, at 1.
93. John A. Robertson, Fetal Tissue Transplants, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 443,493-98 (1988).
94. John A. Robertson, Fetal Tissue Transplant Research Is Ethical, IRB, Nov.-Dec.
1988, at 5.
95. Ironically, Professor Robertson has recently contended that the fetal tissue trans-
plantation provision of the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 is unconstitutional since it un-
duly burdens the mothers who abort. See Robertson, supra note 14. For a more in-depth
presentation of the ethical debate over fetal tissue transplantation, see James F. Childress,
Ethics, Public Policy, and Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research, 1 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 93 (1991); D. Gareth Jones, Fetal Neural Transplantation: Placing the Ethical
Debate Within the Context of Society's Use of Human Material, 5 BIOETHICS 23 (1991);
Thomas H. Murray, Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research: Conflict in Ethics and
Public Policy, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 704 (J. Douglas Butler & David F.
Walbert eds., 4th ed. 1992); Sanders, supra note 2, at 400; Nicolas P. Terry, Politics and
Privacy: Refining the Ethical and Legal Issue in Fetal Tissue Transplantation, 66 WASH. U.
L.Q. 523, 542-44 (1988); Thompson, supra note 24, at 52. For an interesting discussion on
how different religions feel about fetal tissue transplantation research, see Shauna S. Rob-
erts, Potential Cure, Ethical Questions: Using Fetal Tissue Transplantation as Therapy for
Insulin-Dependent Diabetes, DIABETES FORECAST, Aug. 1995, at 42.
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significant impact on this type of research. Among these relevant federal
laws are: cases, regulations, a uniform law, and additional federal statutes.
A. CASE LAW
1. Margaret S. v. Treen 96
This case questioned various provisions of a now-repealed Louisiana
abortion statute.97 In 1980 the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana upheld the constitutionality of the statute as it related to the
prohibition of experimentation, unless therapeutic, on a live or unborn
child. 98 In 1981, the Louisiana legislature amended the statute to include
non-viable fetuses within its scope.99 The revision was subsequently
found by the district court to be unconstitutional.'0 0 The court concluded
that the amended provision of the statute was "violative of the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringe[d] on the
rights of physicians to participate in fetal research . . .101
B. FEDERAL REGULATIONS
1. Public Welfare: Additional Protections Pertaining to Research,
Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses,
Pregnant Women and Human In-Vitro Fertilization,
45 C.FR. §§ 46.201-211 (1994)
This regulation was originally promulgated in 1975102 and as such is the
earliest federal law on the issue. Its scope includes research involving
"(1) the fetus, (2) pregnant women, and (3) human in vitro fertiliza-
tion.' 01 °3 Of particular interest to this Comment are sections 46.209 and
46.210, concerning fetuses that are out of the womb (ex utero). Section
46.209 focuses on viable and nonviable (but living) fetuses ex utero and
allows research on them in a very limited set of circumstances.1 0 4
96. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1986).
97. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.35.1-18 (West Supp. 1981).
98. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 221 (E.D. La. 1980). The provision
stated: "No person shall experiment upon or sell a live or unborn child unless such experi-
mentation is therapeutic to the child or unborn child." LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1979).
99. The amendment stated: "No person shall experiment on an unborn child or child
born as a result of abortion, whether the unborn child or child is alive or dead, unless the
experimentation is therapeutic to the unborn child or child." LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.13 (West Supp. 1982).
100. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. at 676.
101. Id. at 675.
102. See 40 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1975).
103. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (1994).
104. If an ex utero fetus is found to be viable, it is considered human and thus may only
be experimented on as any other human. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(c) (1994). If the viability of the
fetus is yet to be determined, research will not be allowed unless:
(1) There will be no added risk to the fetus resulting from the activity, and
the purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means, or
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The regulation also establishes two very narrow consent limitations
that must be satisfied before research may be conducted on nonviable
fetuses or fetuses whose viability has not yet been determined. 10 5 First,
informed consent must be obtained from the mother and father.10 6 Sec-
ond, informed consent is only valid if both parents are "legally compe-
tent.1 0 7 Section 46.210 concerns itself only with "dead" fetuses and
states that research may only be conducted on them "in accordance with
any applicable State or local laws regarding such activities.' 0 8
2. Public Welfare: Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.ER. § 63.31
(1994)
This regulation merely states that all federal grants relating to fetal tis-
sue transplantation research are subject to the provisions set forth in Part
46 of Title 45 in the Code of Federal Regulations relating to the protec-
tion of human subjects. 10 9 Thus, to receive federal funding, all research-
ers desiring to perform fetal tissue transplantation research are required
to conduct their research in accordance with the previously discussed
regulation. 10
C. THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAL Giwr ACT1"'
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act was first proposed in 1968 and was
later substantially revised to its present form, commonly referred to as
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987. This uniform law was estab-
lished to govern tissue donation from all dead humans, including dead
fetuses. 112 The law permits the use of human tissue for the purpose of
education, research, or the advancement of science. 1 3 The law, however,
requires that a physician determine the time of death 14 and that in-
(2) The purpose of the activity is to enhance the possibility of survival of
the particular fetus to the point of viability.
45 C.F.R. § 209 (a)(1)-(2) (1994). If, however, the fetus is found to be nonviable, it may not
be involved in research unless:
"(1) Vital functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained, (2) Experimental activi-
ties which of themselves would terminate the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will not
be employed, and (3) The purpose of the activity is the development of important biomedi-
cal knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means." 45 C.F.R. § 209 (b)(1)-(3)
(1994).
105. Id. § 46.209(d) (1994).
106. Id. The father's informed consent is not necessary where "(1) His identity or
whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not reasonably available, or (3)
the pregnancy resulted from rape." Id.
107. Id.
108. 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1994). In the Code of Federal Regulations, a "dead fetus" is
defined as a "fetus ex utero which exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory ac-
tivity, spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical cord (if
still attached)." Id. § 46.203(f) (1994).
109. Id. § 63.31 (1994).
110. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
111. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Gn'r ACT §§ 1-17, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1994).
112. Id. § 1(2), 8A U.L.A. 30.
113. Id. § 6(a)(1)-(2), 8A U.L.A. 53.
114. Id. § 8(b), 8A U.L.A. 56.
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formed consent be obtained prior to the donation of any tissue. 115 The
fetus' parents have the highest decisional authority in granting the requi-
site consent. 116
The 1987 revision added section 10 which explicitly prohibits the actual
sale or purchase of any human body parts for any consideration beyond
that necessary to pay for expenses incurred in the removal, processing,
and transportation of the tissue.117 Violation of this provision in the
states that have adopted the 1987 version of the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act is considered a felony and carries a severe penalty." 8 Within
these limitations, some states have nonetheless added a clarification spec-
ifying that the donation of human tissue for transplantation is to be un-
derstood as a service and not as a sale." 9
Although the 1968 version of the Act was adopted by all fifty states and
the District of Columbia, 120 as of 1993 only fifteen states had incorpo-
rated the 1987 version within their statutes. 12' In this context, it is impor-
tant to recognize that uniform laws defer final control to the states and, as
such, need to be ratified by the individual state legislatures to be legally
binding and enforceable. Thus, the current version is law in only those
fifteen states that have specifically adopted it.
D. FEDERAL STATUTES
1. Health Research Extension Act of 1985122
This Act outlines the recommendations under which research involving
living human fetuses may be conducted. It includes provisions applicable
to both nonviable aborted fetuses and living human fetuses ex utero for
whom viability has not yet been determined. 123 The Act limits fetal re-
search or experimentation to those projects that may enhance the well
being or health of the fetus, without imposing added risk, and whose pur-
115. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT OF 1968 § 2, 8A U.L.A. 99 (1994).
116. Id. § 3.
117. See UNrF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a)-(b), 8A U.L.A. 58.
118. Id. § 10(c). A maximum civil fine of $50,000 is authorized through this section as
well as a potential five-year jail sentence. Id.
119. Id. § 11 cmt., 8A U.L.A. 60.
120. TABLE OF JURISDICTIONS, UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT OF 1968, 8A U.L.A. 63.
121. Of the 15 states, only Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Washington have adopted the
1987 version since 1990. The other 12 states are: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
TABLE OF JURISDICTIONS, UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 19.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 289g (Supp. V 1993).
123. Section 289g(a) states:
The Secretary may not conduct or support any research or experimenta-
tion, in the United States or in any other country, on a nonviable living
human fetus ex utero or a living human fetus ex utero for whom viability has
not been ascertained unless the research or experimentation -
(1) may enhance the well-being or meet the health needs of the fetus or
enhance the probability of its survival to viability; or
(2) will pose no added risk of suffering, injury, or death to the fetus and the
purpose of the research or experimentation is the development of important
biomedical knowledge which cannot be obtained by other means.
1996]
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pose is to develop important biomedical knowledge that is not obtainable
by other means. 124
2. National Organ Transplant Act 2 5
This statute prohibits the selling of any human organ for valuable con-
sideration if the sell involves interstate commerce. 126 In 1988 Congress
amended the definition of "human organ" to include fetal organs.'2 7
Thus, the Act effectively prohibits the selling of fetal tissue for valuable
consideration if the sale affects interstate commerce.
3. NIH Revitalization Act of 1993128
The NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 incorporates most of the prior fed-
eral statutory and regulatory provisions on fetal tissue transplantation to
form a fairly comprehensive set of guidelines governing this type of re-
search. 12 9 It also provides elaborate consent and documentation require-
ments to effectively separate the decision to abort from the decision to
donate the fetal tissue. 30 The relevant part of the Act consists of a series
of requirements, a series of prohibitions, and a list of criminal and civil
penalties.
a. Requirements
The Act allows the tissue from any type of abortion to be used in fetal
tissue transplantation research,' 3' but the tissue can only be used for
"therapeutic purposes."' 32 Even though Congress has expressly author-
ized fetal tissue transplantation research to be conducted with electively-
aborted tissue, 33 federally-funded research must be performed in accord-
ance with state law.'3 Also, before tissue can be used for fetal tissue
transplantation research, a written statement must be provided by the
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
126. Id. § 274e(a).
127. Id. § 274e(c)(1).
128. lL §§ 289g-1 & g-2 (Supp. V 1993).
129. The Senate Report accompanying the bill contends that Congress intended "the
guidelines in this bill be promulgated uniformly in both public and private sectors and
monitored by the National Institutes of Health." S. REP. No. 2, supra note 8, at 23. Thus,
although the Act, on its face, purports to be limited to federally-funded research, the legis-
lative history of the Act states that the law is meant to address privately-funded research as
well.
130. Id. at 22.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-l(a)(2) states: "Human fetal tissue may be used in research ...
regardless of whether the tissue is obtained pursuant to a spontaneous or induced abortion
or pursuant to a stillbirth."
132. Id. § 289g-l(a)(1).
133. Id. § 289g-l(a)(2) pronounces that: "Human fetal tissue may be used in research
carried out [for therapeutic purposes] regardless of whether the tissue is obtained pursuant
to a spontaneous or induced abortion or pursuant to a stillbirth."
134. Id. § 289g-l(e). Additionally, research that is conducted by the Department of
Health and Human Services may only be conducted "in accordance with applicable State
and local law." Id.
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mother of the fetus verifying that three requirements have been satis-
fied: 135 1) she is donating the tissue to be used only for therapeutic pur-
poses;136 2) there have been no restrictions placed on who may be a
recipient of the tissue; 137 and 3) she has not been told who the recipient
is.
3 8
Similarly, the attending physician who performs the abortion must sign
a written statement certifying that five additional requirements were met
before the abortion was conducted. 139 First, the mother's consent for the
abortion must have been "obtained prior to requesting or obtaining con-
sent for a donation" for use in the transplantation research.140 Second,
there must have been "no alteration of the timing, method, or procedures
used to terminate the pregnancy" so that higher quality tissue could be
obtained. 14' Third, the abortion must have been "performed in accord-
ance with applicable State law."'1 42 Fourth, the tissue must have truly
been donated in accordance with the requirements set out in the mother's
statement. 143 Last, the mother must have been fully informed of the doc-
tor's "interest ... in the research to be conducted,"' 44 and "risks to her
privacy that might be associated with the donation of the tissue .... ,,145
Moreover, the person primarily responsible for the research to be per-
formed on the fetal tissue must make a written statement declaring sev-
eral things.' 46 First, he must state that he is aware "the tissue is human
fetal tissue"' 47 which "was donated for research purposes."'1 48 Second, he
must state that he has provided this information to others involved in the
research. 49 Third, before the researcher gets consent from a recipient of
the transplantation, he must obtain a written acknowledgment from that
person that they are aware of the type of tissue to be used. 50 Last, the
researcher must state that he "had no part in any decisions as to the tim-
ing, method, or procedures used to terminate the pregnancy made solely
for the purpose of the research.' 15 '
135. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-l(b)(1).
136. Id. § 289g-l(b)(1)(A).
137. Id. § 289g-l(b)(1)(B).
138. Id. § 289g-1(b)(1)(C).
139. Id § 289g-l(b)(2).
140. Id. § 289g-1(b)(2)(A)(i).
141. Id. § 289g-l(b)(2)(A)(ii).
142. Id. § 289g-1(b)(2)(A)(iii).
143. Id. § 289g-l(b)(2)(B).
144. Id § 289g-1(b)(2)(C)(i).
145. Id. § 289g-1(b)(2)(C)(ii).
146. Id. § 289g-1(c).
147. Id. § 289g-1(c)(1)(A).
148. Id. § 289g-1(c)(1)(C).
149. Id. § 289g-1(c)(1)(B).
150. Id. § 289g-1(c)(3).




Apart from the general prohibitions found in section 289g-1 for which
no penalties are articulated, 52 section 289g-2 lists four specific prohibi-
tions to which heavy criminal and civil penalties are attached. The first
prohibition is that there shall be no purchasing or selling of fetal tissue
beyond reasonable preparation and handling costs. 153 Second, soliciting
or acquiring a donation of fetal tissue by promising the mother she can
designate the donee is expressly prohibited.' 5 4 Also, it is unlawful for a
person to promise the mother that the fetal tissue will be transplanted
into one of her relatives so that she will donate the tissue.' 55 Similarly,
the Act prohibits the solicitation or acquisition of donated tissue by the
person who "has provided valuable consideration for the costs associated
with [the] abortion."' 5 6
The one limitation placed on these prohibitions is that the transfer, so-
licitation, donation, or acquisition of the tissue must affect "interstate
commerce."'1 57 The statute expresses that "interstate commerce" has the
same meaning attached to that term in 21 U.S.C. § 321(b). 158 In that sec-
tion, "interstate commerce" is defined as "(1) commerce between any
State or Territory and any place outside thereof, and (2) commerce within
the District of Columbia or within any other Territory not organized with
a legislative body.' u5 9
c. Penalties
There are severe criminal and civil penalties that accompany the viola-
tion of any of the prohibitions set out above.' 60 Senator Edward Ken-
nedy, during congressional debate, stated that these penalties are "tough,
strict, and will be effective in preventing any potential abuses in this
152. These include prohibitions against:
1) using fetal tissue for non-therapeutic purposes (Id. § 289 g-l(a)(1));
2) restricting the identity of recipients (Id. § 289 g-l(b)(1)(B));
3) informing the woman of the identity of recipients (Id. § 289 g-l(b)(1)(C));
4) requesting or obtaining consent for a donation of tissue before the woman consents to
the abortion (Id. § 289 g-l(b)(2)(A)(i));
5) altering the timing, method, or procedures of the abortion to obtain higher quality
tissue (Id. § 289 g-l(b)(2)(A)(ii)); and
6) not fully disclosing the physician's interests in the research or the mother's health and
privacy risks involved with the process (Id § 289 g-l(b)(2)(C)).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(a) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human fetal tissue for valuable consideration
. ...." Section 289g-2(d)(3) defines "valuable consideration" as excluding "reasonable pay-
ments associated with the transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality
control, or storage of human fetal tissue."
154. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(b)(1).
155. Id. § 289g-2(b)(2).
156. Id. § 289g-2(b)(3).
157. Id. § 289g-2(a),(b).
158. Id. § 289g-2(d)(2).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 321(b) (1988).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(c).
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area."'161 Any person who commits one of the offenses listed in the
prohibitions section "shall be fined in accordance with Title 18, subject to
paragraph (2)" or imprisoned for up to ten years or both. 162 For those
who transfer fetal tissue through interstate commerce and those who so-
licit or acquire the tissue after providing "valuable consideration for the
costs associated with [the] abortion" a specific fine is to be imposed. 163
Persons who fall within that group shall be fined at least twice as much as
the amount of the "valuable consideration" they received. 164
VII. REMAINING PROBLEMS
The NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 solved many of the ethical and
legal problems that existed with fetal tissue transplantation research prior
to its enactment. But only an omniscient legislature could foresee all the
potential scientific developments in a particular area or all the possible
loopholes created by its legislation and thus provide a "perfect" statute
on its first attempt. Unsurprisingly, Congress' first attempt at providing a
comprehensive statute to cover fetal tissue transplantation research has
kinks which need to be worked out of the statute over time. The follow-
ing sections contemplate a few of the potential problems with the NIH
Revitalization Act as enacted.
A. POSSIBLE ABUSES OF THE TECHNOLOGY
In section 289g-l(a), Congress stated that fetal tissue transplantation
research may be conducted for therapeutic purposes. There is a huge
problem with this section-Congress neglected to define the term "thera-
peutic purposes." This omission could lead to widespread abuse of fetal
tissue transplantation technology.
Some have theorized that the technology may develop to the point
where drugs could be produced from fetal tissue that will not only repair
damaged tissue, but will have the ability to enhance the normal function-
ing of the body.165 Currently, researchers have discovered that fetal tis-
sue injections can accelerate muscle healing in animals. 166 It is
foreseeable, then, that fetal injections could be used to "enhance-like
steroids-the ability of athletes, thus raising the specter of Olympic com-
petitors running on 'baby power.' "167 Thus, it is not a great leap to con-
ceive of tissue being developed containing mind-altering substances,
pheremones, adrenaline, or other materials meant to intensify existing
human biological functions. All of these developments could result from
research that was performed for "therapeutic purposes."
161. 139 CONG. REC. S1580 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(c)(1).
163. Id. § 289g-2(c)(2).
164. Id. § 289g-2(c)(2).





B. VAGUENESS OF THE CONSIDERATION PROVISIONS
The Act explicitly states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to know-
ingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human fetal tissue for
valuable consideration .... ",168 The Act also contends that "'valuable
consideration' does not include reasonable payments associated with the
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, or
storage of human fetal tissue. ' 169 Thus, the Act purports to allow the sale
of tissue for valuable consideration if only "reasonable" handling costs
are charged. This leaves a lot of room for unscrupulous tissue processors
to abuse the law and reap large financial rewards while providing inferior
quality tissue.
Consequently, the Act's very purpose (making quality fetal tissue
available to researchers) is undermined by the vagueness of such a provi-
sion. It is not hard to imagine an organization that processes fetal tissue
cutting every conceivable corner so that they have minimal overhead for
a piece of tissue, but charging the greatest possible amount in the name of
"reasonable" processing fees. Imagine a firm in California deciding to go
into business as a fetal tissue processing plant. The plant receives all of
the discarded fetal tissue from abortions performed in the area. The
plant then performs minimal preparation to turn the discarded tissue into
apparently transplantable tissue. After this, they throw the tissue into a
freezer that they have purchased at a garage sale. Up to this point, entire
preparation costs total twenty-five dollars.
Next, a researcher in New York asks that transplantable tissue be
shipped to him for transplantation into a Parkinson's patient. The inade-
quately prepared tissue is then mailed to the researcher in a small
styrofoam cooler that costs the processors five dollars. The handling
costs for this transaction total thirty dollars.
The researcher, however, is not charged thirty dollars. He is charged
one thousand dollars for "reasonable" processing and shipping fees. Af-
ter all, one thousand dollars is not entirely unreasonable when one con-
siders all the costs involved in adequately preparing tissue for
transplantation. 170 The firm would thus have a $970 profit for each trans-
action. If the firm were to make such a transaction just once a day, it
would have a yearly profit of over $350,000. In addition to the cost prob-
lem, the transplantation will likely be unsuccessful because the tissue was
168. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(a) (Supp. V 1993).
169. Id. § 289g-2(d)(3).
170. In the above example, the unethical California firm could claim the following
expenses:
1) Processing - $300;
2) Quality Control - $200;
3) Preservation - $100;
4) Storage - $100; and
5) Transportation - $300.
These expenses, while potentially accurate if the tissue were properly handled and shipped,




inadequately processed and shipped. This may lead many to believe that
transplantations do not work; even though they could work if performed
with adequately prepared tissue.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL BAN ON
DESIGNATED DONATION
The NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or knowingly acquire,
receive, or accept a donation of human fetal tissue for the purpose of
transplantation of such tissue into another person if the donation af-
fects interstate commerce, the tissue will be or is obtained pursuant
to an induced abortion, and -
(1) the donation will be or is made pursuant to a promise to the
donating individual that the donated tissue will be transplanted into
a recipient specified by such individual;
(2) the donated tissue will be transplanted into a relative of the do-
nating individual; or
(3) the person who solicits or knowingly acquires, receives, or ac-
cepts the donation has provided valuable consideration for the costs
associated with such abortion.171
This section effectively makes it illegal for a woman to get pregnant for
the sole purpose of creating fetal tissue for transplantation.'
72
In a recent article, John Robertson contends that this section makes the
Act unconstitutional.' 73 Professor Robertson argues that the decision to
abort solely to obtain tissue for transplantation involves a woman's "fun-
damental rights of privacy, bodily integrity, and procreative auton-
omy."'1 74 For Robertson, the fact that the Act does not, by its own terms,
prohibit abortions to obtain tissue for transplantation is irrelevant.175
Although the prohibition in the Act appears directed at the physician or
researcher who will obtain the tissue from the woman who aborts, the
prohibition infringes on a woman's fundamental right to have an
abortion.176
According to Professor Robertson, this is true for two reasons: 1) the
purpose of the prohibition infringes on a woman's fundamental right to
abort, and 2) the prohibition unduly burdens women who desire to abort
so they can donate fetal tissue to loved ones. 177 Robertson claims that
the "purpose of the law appears clearly to be to reduce or stop abortions
to obtain tissue for transplant.' 78 This purpose, he says, is invalid be-
171. 42 U.S.C. § 289g-2(b) (Supp. V 1993).
172. An example being a woman getting pregnant solely to provide fetal tissue for her
father who is suffering from Parkinson's disease. See Jenn S. Bregman, Comment, Conceiv-
ing to Abort and Donate Fetal Tissue: New Ethical Strains in the Transplantation Field - A
Survey of Existing Law and a Proposal for Change, 36 UCLA L. REv. 1167 (1989).
173. See Robertson, supra note 14.
174. Id. at 29.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 30.
177. Id
178. Robertson, supra note 14, at 30.
. 1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
cause Roe v. Wade179 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey180 reveal that "a
woman is free to abort for any reason.'' 1sl The Act is unduly burden-
some because it has the clear "effect of stopping women who wish to
donate fetal tissue to loved ones from doing so, by removing their ability
to effectuate a purpose or reason in seeking the abortion.' 8 2
Professor Robertson contends that intrinsic in the right to abort is "the
right to designate a recipient because the power to do so is central to the
decision itself to abort."'1 83 Without an abortion, there will be no fetal
tissue to dispose of.184 "But the abortion will not occur, unless the wo-
man is guaranteed the right to determine who receives fetal remains."'185
Robertson contends that Congress had two possible interests to protect
in promulgating this prohibition, but neither interest is sufficient to meet
a "compelling interest/less restrictive alternative standard necessary to
justify infringement of fundamental constitutional rights."' 8 6 Congress'
first interest in establishing the prohibition was "to minimize abortions in
order to protect fetuses. '187 But Roe and Casey reveal that such an inter-
est does not create sufficient justification to override a woman's funda-
mental right to abort.'88 Robertson also believes that the Act was meant
"to prevent women from being pressured or coerced into having abor-
tions for family members."' 8 9 He contends that this might be a legitimate
interest, but there are less restrictive means available to protect this inter-
est. 190 As Professor Robertson says, "[t]he mere fact that some pressur-
ing might occur is no reason to ban all designated donations."' 191
VIII. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
A. DEFINE "THERAPEUTIC PURPOSES" AND PROVIDE PENALTIES FOR
NON-THERAPEUTIC USES
The potential for the abuse of fetal tissue transplantation technology is
great, but it could easily be curbed by adding two provisions to the Act.
First, Congress should amend section 289g-1 to include a definition of
"therapeutic purposes." Second, criminal penalties should be attached to
non-therapeutic uses by including such uses in the prohibitions of section
289g-2.
An example of a proper definition of "therapeutic purposes" is:
179. 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
180. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
181. Robertson, supra note 14, at 30 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 30-31.
183. Id. at 32.
184. Id. at 33.
185. Id
186. Robertson, supra note 14 at 33-34.
187. Id. at 33.
188. Id.





The term "therapeutic purposes" means purposes intended to
treat persons suffering from a disease, injury, ailment or infirmity in
order to increase, maintain, or improve the functional capacity of
such persons. The term does not mean purposes intended to en-
hance the functional capacity of individuals beyond normal physio-
logical levels.192
This definition clearly establishes that fetal tissue transplantation should
only be performed for the benefit of those inflicted with certain maladies,
which have caused them to function below a normal level. The second
sentence of the definition also clarifies that fetal tissue transplantation
research may not be performed in order to develop substances that are
meant merely to enhance a healthy person's physiological functioning.
This definition would effectively eliminate the vagueness that presently
accompanies the Act's use of the term "therapeutic purposes."
As well, certain penalties should be made to attach to those who
choose, in spite of this definition, to abuse the technology. The Act
should be amended to make it a criminal offense to create or use any
substance formed from fetal tissue for "non-therapeutic purposes." In
other words, those who abuse the technology should be harshly fined,
jailed, or both.193
B. REQUIRE FETAL TISSUE PROCESSORS TO OBTAIN A PERMIT IN
ORDER TO CHARGE FOR PROCESSED TISSUE
The problem of unscrupulous tissue processors abusing the Act by
"selling" inadequately processed tissue could be answered with a permit
requirement. Congress should amend the Act to include such a require-
ment so that this abusive practice will be prevented in the future. A
proper amendment would require that every fetal tissue processor satisfy
three requirements: 1) they must have quality processing equipment to be
able to produce transplantable tissue;194 2) they must keep accurate
records of all procedures performed on the tissue; and 3) they must re-
port, on a monthly basis, all fetal tissue related procedures, with resulting
costs, to the Department of Health and Human Services.
192. As there are no state or federal codes that directly define "therapeutic purposes,"
this definition is compiled from several state codes that use the term "therapeutic." See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1501 (Supp. 1994) (defining "accepted therapeutic purpose");
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-596.51 (1993) (defining "therapeutic services"); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28:822 (West Supp. 1995) (defining "therapeutic services"); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34-B, § 1801 (West Supp. 1994) (defining "theraupeutic services").
193. Section 289g-2(c)(1) currently reads: "Any person who violates subsection (a) or
(b) of this section shall be fined in accordance with Title 18, subject to paragraph (2), or
imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both." Id. To affect the recommended change,
Congress could merely change this subsection to read: Any person who violates subsection
(a) or (b) of this section or subsection (a) of § 289g-1 shall be fined in accordance with Title
18, subject to paragraph (2), or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
194. In tandem with this requirement, a regulation should be promulgated containing a
list of devices, any combination of which would be considered quality processing equip-
ment sufficient to produce transplantable fetal tissue.
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Such a permit program would be beneficial for at least three reasons.
First, the program would ensure that all processing plants have at least
the minimal quality of equipment necessary to develop transplantable tis-
sue. Second, such a permit requirement would make data available to the
proper agency concerning the type of procedures that have been per-
formed on tissue, and the amounts of money that have been spent on
these procedures. This would allow proper fines to be assessed against
organizations for charging greater than "reasonable" processing fees for
fetal tissue. Third, the government could inspect the facilities of each
processor to be certain that proper processing procedures are being un-
dertaken at each facility, and to fine those facilities that have reported
false information or that evidence an inadequate processing of the tissue.
Additionally, the information obtained from the monthly reports could
be used to establish regulations that would set limits on what qualify as
"reasonable" processing fees. As data are collected by the Department
of Health and Human Services, national expense numbers can be promul-
gated within the federal regulations that represent the average cost of
each procedure to fetal tissue processors. These numbers could then be
used as the guidelines for prosecuting tissue processors who charge sub-
stantially above these amounts for processed fetal tissue. The permit pro-
gram coupled with the nationally promulgated "reasonable processing
cost" regulations would effectively resolve the vagueness problem with
the Act's consideration provisions as they currently exist.
C. AMEND THE ACT TO INCLUDE THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS
AVAILABLE TO PREVENT WOMEN FROM BEING COERCED
TO ABORT
Professor Robertson suggests that Congress could resolve the apparent
unconstitutionality of the prohibition on designated donations through
"the development of procedures to minimize coercion and undue influ-
ence on women who could produce the fetal tissue that family members
need to protect their health."'1 95 This could easily be accomplished by
amending section 289g-2(b) to read:
It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or knowingly acquire,
receive, or accept a donation of human fetal tissue for the purpose of
transplantation of such tissue into another person if the donation af-
fects interstate commerce, the tissue will be or is obtained pursuant
to an induced abortion, and the donating individual was coerced into
donating the tissue.
This amended provision would allow the government to use its
prosecutorial discretion in charging individuals for violating this section,
while at the same time causing no intrusion into a woman's fundamental
right to abort. Thus, the amended provision would be constitutionally
valid because it is the least restrictive means available to protect the
195. Robertson, supra note 14, at 35.
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aborting individual's interest of being free from coercion in making her
decision to abort and donate the resulting fetal material.
IX. CONCLUSION
Congress should be commended for being able to accomplish some-
thing many before them were unable to do-provide a federal law that
allows fetal tissue transplantation research to be conducted and federally
supported in the United States. At the same time, however, Congress
should be chastised for creating such a sloppy law. They have left the
door wide open for a multitude of abuses of the technology and the law,
and in the process, may have infringed on a woman's fundamental right
to have an abortion. In their attempts to assist in the development of
cures for diseases, they have created the opportunity for unethical per-
sons to use the technology to their ultimate advantage regardless of
whom it may hurt.
By making three relatively minor alterations, Congress could avoid
these problems. If they merely define the term "therapeutic purposes"
they could avoid the possibility of future abuse of the fetal tissue trans-
plantation research technology. If they promulgate a permit program to
be applied to those seeking to process fetal tissue for use in research, they
could effectively deter unscrupulous processors from reaping huge finan-
cial rewards from inadequate preparation of the tissue. Finally, if Con-
gress merely provides that it shall be unlawful to use fetal tissue that has
been obtained pursuant to an abortion where the mother was coerced
into donating the resulting tissue, the Act would not infringe on a wo-
man's fundamental right to have an abortion and donate the resulting
material.
Because of the volatile nature of this subject, it is imperative that Con-
gress reevaluate its prior legislation. This is not likely to happen, how-
ever, until someone brings a constitutional challenge against the Act
itself. This Comment presents some possible approaches persons could
take in challenging the Act, but there would still remain several jurisdic-
tional problems if such a challenge were brought, e.g., standing, ripeness,
mootness. Due to these factors, it is unlikely that Congress will choose to
discuss amending the Act for quite some time. In the meantime, it is
apparent that fetal tissue transplantation research technology can be, and
probably will be, abused.
It is not too late. With a little prodding by the right person or persons,
Congress could make a few minor adjustments to the Act and to the fed-
eral regulations that could resolve several problems within the existing
Act. These minor alterations would allow Congress to produce the law
that they intended in 1993.
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